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INTRODUCTION

Since 2000, security breaches have exposed over two hundred
1
In 2006 alone, data
million sensitive personal data records.
† J.D. Candidate 2010, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S., Information
Networking, Carnegie Mellon University, 2004; B.S., Mathematics/Computer
Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 1994. The author gratefully acknowledges
advice from Professor J. David Prince, the efforts of William Mitchell Law Review
staff and editors who worked on this note, and the patience and support of his
wife.
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handlers lost eighty-three million records. Lost data has become
so common that a breach must now affect millions of records even
3
to be newsworthy. One of the first widely publicized breaches,
4
ChoicePoint’s 2005 disclosure of 163,000 consumer records, seems
5
6
almost harmless compared to the breaches at TJX, Certegy,
7
8
Circuit City, and the Department of Veterans Affairs, each of
which lost millions of records.
Many states passed data breach notification laws in response to
9
this problem. These laws require anyone handling personal data
10
to notify people when their data might have been compromised.
As of 2008, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
11
enacted data breach notification laws. These laws have increased
the visibility of data breaches, but have not solved the underlying
12
problem of poor data security.
Minnesota recently attempted to fill part of this gap with a law
forbidding companies from storing sensitive credit card

1. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2008).
2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION:
DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS
LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 12 n.18 (2007) [hereinafter
2007 GAO REPORT]. This is a conservative estimate. It does not include the
breach of CardSystems’ database, for example, which may have compromised up
to forty million records although a CardSystems official claimed that only 263,000
of those records included “sensitive personal information.” Id.
3. Data handlers announced 346 data breach events in 2006—an average of
almost one per day, with no more than six days between announcements. See
Attrition.org, Data Loss Database, http://attrition.org/dataloss/dldos.html (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007). At that rate, a newspaper would need a regular data breach
column to report them all.
4. See Harry R. Weber, ChoicePoint Agrees to Settlement in Data Scandal, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at D2.
5. Larry Greenemeier, TJX Stored Customer Data, Violated Visa Payment Rules,
INFO. WK., Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/show
Article.jhtml?articleID=197001447.
6. See Latest Data Breach Hits Certegy, Info Allegedly Used Only For Marketing,
CREDIT UNION J., July 9, 2007, at 4.
7. See Will Wade, Security Watch, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2006, at 5.
8. See David Stout, Veterans Agency to Atone with Free Credit Monitoring, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A22.
9. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (2007).
10. Id.
11. See infra note 23.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
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13

authorization data.
It adopted this requirement from a credit
card industry standard called the Payment Card Industry Data
14
Security Standard (PCI DSS). PCI DSS sets specific technical and
15
business process requirements for securing credit card data.
Anyone who “store[s], process[es], or handl[es]” credit card data
16
must comply with PCI DSS.
Minnesota’s law, however, raises some troubling issues. PCI
DSS only addresses credit card data, and Minnesota adopted only
17
one part of the standard. Minnesota’s law provides remedies only
18
to financial institutions, not consumers. Some have argued that
the law is unnecessary because PCI DSS is already a requirement
19
for anyone who handles, processes, or stores credit card data.
This note examines these issues, argues that Minnesota’s law does
not do enough to help consumers, and that Minnesota should fill
this gap by adopting a statutory duty of due care for data security.
Part II of this note describes state data breach notification laws
and explains why they do not adequately improve data security.
Part III describes PCI DSS and then discusses Minnesota’s law and
some of its features and problems. Finally, Part IV argues for a
statutory duty of due care and addresses some features such a law
should have.

13. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (Supp. 2007). Sensitive authorization data
includes the data from a credit card’s magnetic stripe, the PIN verification code,
and the credit card verification code (known as the CID, CVV2, or CVC2 code,
depending upon the card brand). See PCI SEC. STANDARD COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD
INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY STANDARD GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
(2007),
http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_glossary_v1-1.pdf
[hereinafter PCI DSS GLOSSARY]. Anyone armed with this data can duplicate a
card. See VISA USA, CISP BULLETIN: TOP FIVE DATA SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
IDENTIFIED TO PROMOTE MERCHANT AWARENESS 1 (2006), http://usa.visa.com/
merchants/risk_management/cisp_alerts.html (follow “CISP Bulletins” hyperlink
in middle of page; then follow “Top Five Data Security Vulnerabilities Identified to
Promote Merchant Awareness—August 29, 2006”).
14. See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA
SECURITY STANDARD 1 (2006), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/index.
htm (follow the link at “Click here to download the Specification”) [hereinafter
PCI DSS]; Jaikumar Vijayan, Minnesota Gives PCI Rules a Legal Standing,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 28, 2007, at 40.
15. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 1.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See id.
19. See Nadia Oehlsen, Data Security is Fast Becoming a Matter of Law, CARDS &
PAYMENTS, Oct. 1, 2007, at 32, available at 2007 WLNR 20225381.
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II. THE FIRST STEP: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
A. History and Features
Some of the first broad legislative efforts to improve data
20
security came in the form of security breach notification laws.
California led the charge in 2002 by becoming the first state to pass
21
a law requiring public disclosure of security incidents. Most states
22
followed with similar laws of their own. As of January 2008, thirtynine states and the District of Columbia had enacted data breach
23
notification laws.
20. Other laws affecting data security at the time only apply to certain
industries. For example, the Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) covers health care, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) applies
to financial institutions. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2007) (HIPAA applicability); 15
U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2000) (GLBA).
21. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4501–04 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. §§ 1798.29,
1798.82 (2007)).
22. 2005 was a banner year for breach notification laws, with at least thirty-five
states considering such laws and twenty-two states enacting them. National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 Breach of Information Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breach05.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2008).
23. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4110-101 to -108 (Supp. 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (West Supp.
2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36a-701b (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12B-101 to -104 (2005);
2007-3 D.C. Code Adv. Leg. Serv. 29–32 (LexisNexis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681
(West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 487N-1 to -4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-51-104 to 107 (Supp. 2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/1–30 (West Supp. 2007); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.9-1-1 to -5-1 (West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to 7a04 (Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071–3077 (Supp. 2008); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 1346 to 1350-A (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 143504 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); 2007 Mass. Legis. Serv. 540–48 (West); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1701 to -1705 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-801 to
-807 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 603A.010–.920 (LexisNexis Supp.
2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 to :21 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-163 (West Supp. 2007); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney Supp.
2008) (applying to private organizations); N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 208 (McKinney
Supp. 2008) (covering state agencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2007); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 51-30-01 to -07 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19-.192
(West Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3113.1 (West Supp. 2008); 73 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2301–2329 (West Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 11-49.2-1 to -7
(Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 48.101-.203 (Vernon Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101 to -301
(Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
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Data breach notification laws require organizations to notify
data subjects whose personal data the organization reasonably
24
believes has been obtained by a third party. Notification must
25
generally be given in writing reasonably quickly after the breach is
26
discovered, and many data breach notification laws establish
27
penalties for non-compliance.
State data breach notification laws vary in their details,
28
including the standards for notification, the types of personal data

19.255.010 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4012-502 (2007); S.B. 583, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
24. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (West Supp. 2008).
25. See, e.g., id. § 1798.82(g)(1); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(g)(1)
(2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008). Some states
allow substitute notice based on cost. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(g)(3)
(West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(c)(3) (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. §
325E.61, subdiv. 1(g)(3) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(5)(B) (2006).
Utah allows notification through electronic means, telephone, and newspaper
publication without a threshold for cost or number of people affected. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(a) (Supp. 2007). Wisconsin’s statute allows notice by a
means “reasonably calculated to provide actual notice,” but only if the breached
entity cannot determine a data subject’s mailing address.
WIS. STAT.
§ 895.507(3)(b) (West 2006).
26. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2008) (calling for
notification to be “made in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay”); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(a) (2006) (using the same
language as the California statute). A few states set specific time limits for
notification. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(b) (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1349.19(B)(2) (West Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. § 895.507(3)(a) (West 2006).
27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107 (Supp. 2007) (establishing a
maximum $25,000 penalty for intentional failure to comply with notification
requirements); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.9-4-1 to -2 (West. Supp. 2007) (creating up
to a $150,000 civil penalty for “deceptive acts” under the statute); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-44-301(3) (Supp. 2007) (allowing civil fine of $2,500 per affected consumer,
up to $100,000).
28. California’s law and others like it require notice to any person whose data
“was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person”
without regard to whether the breach is likely to cause harm to the data subject.
CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2008). See also MINN. STAT. § 325E.61,
subdiv. 1(a) (2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
Some states allow data handlers to avoid disclosure if they believe the breach does
not pose a risk of harm. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102(a) (2005)
(requiring disclosure only when, after a good-faith internal investigation, the data
handler determines that misuse of the information is “reasonably likely”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(10)(a) (West 2006) (permitting nondisclosure if, after
consultation with relevant law enforcement, the organization determines that the
breach “will not likely result in harm”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(a) (West Supp.
2007) (exempting notification if the breached entity “establishes that misuse of
the information is not reasonably possible.”).
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that trigger the laws, and the causes of action they allow. Critics
cite this “patchwork” of state requirements as a major problem with
31
data breach notification laws. Despite some arguments calling for
32
a uniform national data breach notification standard, Congress
33
has yet to pass such a law.
B. Data Breach Laws’ Inadequacies
Although data breach notification laws warn consumers that
their data may be at risk from a breach, these laws do not solve the
root problem of poor data security. A solution requires more than
mere notice of a breach; it requires laws that encourage careful
34
handling of data and compensate victims. Data breach laws fall
short of these goals.
29. Personal data usually includes, at a minimum: names, account numbers,
driver’s license numbers, and social security numbers. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. §
1798.82(e) (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(e) (2006).
30. Most states allow enforcement through state regulatory agencies or
attorneys general. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-4-1(a) (West Supp. 2007); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(g) (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 6 (2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-07 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(I) (West
Supp. 2007). A few states allow private causes of action. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:3075 (Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(10)(a) (West
2007).
31. See, e.g., Eric Friedberg & Michael McGowan, Lost Backup Tapes, Stolen
Laptops, and Other Tales of Data-Breach Woe, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 42 (Feb. 2007)
(referring to the “patchwork of state data breach notification statutes”); Sean C.
Honeywill, Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial Institutions, 10 N.C.
BANKING INST. 269, 271 (2006) (calling the twenty-one state data breach
notification laws in 2005 a “patchwork regulatory environment”). Because these
laws typically apply to any person or organization that holds data about a person in
that state, an interstate business must either monitor its compliance with a hodgepodge of state data breach laws or choose to comply with the broadest provisions
of all of them. See, e.g., 1 Ian C. Ballon, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: TREATISE
WITH FORMS § 4.09[1][A] (Supp. 2006) (noting that nationwide businesses need to
consider which state laws apply to a particular breach and may choose to follow
the broadest definition of “personal information” and use the most restrictive
method of notification).
32. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information Security Under a
Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 389 (2006); Lilia
Rode, Comment, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the
Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1631–
33 (2007).
33. See Brendan St. Amant, The Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering
Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505, 510–14 (2007); John B.
Kennedy & Anne E. Kennedy, What Went Wrong? What Went Right? Corporate
Responses to Privacy and Security Breaches, 903 PLI/PAT 11, 26 (2007).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
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Notification

Data breach laws aim to notify consumers when their data
35
might be at risk. The constant stream of breach announcements
36
shows that, if nothing else, the laws do that much. Data breach
notification laws force breached entities to warn people whose data
may have been compromised, giving consumers the chance to
37
Yet these announcements happen so
protect themselves.
38
frequently, they may have lost effectiveness. In one survey, almost
forty percent of respondents said they mistook breach notification
39
letters for junk mail.
Data breach notification laws are warnings that only require
disclosure after something bad has happened. But warnings of any
sort are ill-suited to fixing the data security problem because
consumers have little or no control over how their data is
40
handled.
Several years before his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Justice Breyer offered a three-pronged test for determining when
41
disclosure is an effective means of regulation. Disclosure works
well only when the public (1) understands the information
disclosed; (2) has a choice in the market; and (3) believes the
42
The main
information provided is relevant to that choice.
problem with data breach notification is the second prong.
Consumers inevitably have Social Security numbers, credit
histories, bank accounts, and all the other bits of economic data
43
Breached data brokers, like ChoicePoint, never asked
flotsam.
consumers if it could gather their data and consumers could do
44
little to prevent it. Breach notification also fails the third prong of
Justice Breyer’s test. After-the-fact notification of a breach does
35. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 915–16.
36. See Attrition.org, supra note 3.
37. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 936–37.
38. Id. at 916 (discussing criticisms that data breach notification laws create
too many warning letters).
39. Id. at 952 (citing PONEMON INST., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY
BREACH NOTIFICATION 2–4 (2005)).
40. See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1234–38 (2003).
41. STEVEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 164 (1982).
42. Id.
43. See Solove, supra note 40, at 1251–55.
44. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362–66 (2006) (observing that data brokers do
not allow data subjects to opt out of having their data collected and distributed).
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nothing to help consumers choose to work with businesses who will
45
be careful with their data.
2. Behavior Modification
A loftier goal for a data security law would be to make proper
handling of data the financially prudent choice. Laws change
behavior when the expected cost of non-compliance exceeds the
46
cost of the desired behavior. Most organizations choose to invest
in security measures when doing so is, predictably and measurably,
47
A law seeking to encourage
less expensive than not doing so.
organizations to invest in security should therefore make the
expected cost of a breach sufficiently large and predictable.
This model assumes rational actors with enough information
48
to choose actions based on well-defined costs and benefits. Poor
or incomplete information can lead to irrational choices. Put more
49
succinctly: “Garbage in, garbage out.”
Most current information on the likelihood of security
50
breaches is statistically indistinguishable from garbage. Current
45. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 947–48.
46. See David Bender, Privacy Developments—2005, 842 PLI/PAT 9, 19 (2005)
(applying Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” effect to say that companies implement
the level of security they deem necessary to avoid making a breach
announcement).
47. See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
545 (2003). Businesses often follow this cost-benefit or return on investment
approach when evaluating investments in security. See, e.g., Huseyin Cavusoglu,
Birendra Mishra & Srinivasan Raghunathan, A Model for Evaluating IT Security
Investments, COMM. ACM, July 2004, at 87, 87–88; Judy Greenwald, Cost/Benefit
Analysis, Access Crucial to Data Security, BUS. INS., May 23, 2005, at 18; Doug Lewis,
Selling Security to the CFO, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 13, 2003, at 46.
48. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be
Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 360–61 (2002); Gregory Mitchell,
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1913–29 (2002) (discussing criticisms
of the rationality theory).
49. “Garbage in, garbage out” (or GIGO) is a phrase often used in computer
science to capture the idea that a program cannot generate valid output from
invalid data. See 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ADDITIONS SERIES 114 (1993).
Charles Babbage articulated the fundamental idea in the nineteenth century: “On
two occasions I have been asked, ‘Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine
wrong figures, will the right answers come out?’ . . . I am not able rightly to
apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.”
Charles Babbage, PASSAGES FROM THE LIFE OF A PHILOSOPHER 67 (1864).
50. See, e.g., Greg Shipley, Desperately Seeking the Security ROI, NETWORK
COMPUTING, May 27, 2002, at 35; KEVIN J. SOO HOO, HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? A
RISK-MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO COMPUTER SECURITY 29–46 (June 2000)
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51

data security studies have serious methodological problems,
52
53
oversimplify, or do not claim to provide predictive data.
Without this data, the probability of a security event and its
54
An organization’s practices
financial impact are unknown.
regarding uncertainty, therefore, dominate its approach to data
55
Organizations that are risk-averse will over-spend on
security.
56
security, those that seek risk will under-spend on security, and the
risk-neutral will fall in a random distribution somewhere in the
57
middle.
Organizational decisions also depend on the relative value of
hard and soft dollars. Hard dollars count directly and measurably
against an organization’s budget, while soft dollars involve

(Consortium for Research of Information Security and Policy Working Paper),
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11900/soohoo.pdf (discussing the
lack of useful security data).
51. An oft-quoted survey in the computer security industry is the annual
Computer Security Institute (CSI) Security Survey. See COMPUTER SECURITY INST.,
2007 CSI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY (2007), available at
http://gocsi.com/forms/csi_survey.jhtml (registration required).
The CSI
survey’s ten percent response rate and sample bias (self-selecting CSI members
and conference attendees) cast doubt on its results. See id. at 3. The latest survey’s
introduction acknowledges these limitations, calling the survey “informal.” Id. at
2. However, the survey notes that “almost all financial information about
[computer] crime losses are estimates.” Id. at 3. The survey is nonetheless
popular with security vendors, who tend to use the survey’s bullet-point findings in
their marketing materials while conveniently ignoring its self-confessed limitations.
See, e.g., Ira Winkler, Time to End the FBI/CSI Study?, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 26,
2006 (discussing the CSI study’s misuses and statistical problems).
52. One survey, for example, found that the average cost to organizations of a
data breach was $197 per record. See PGP CORP. & VONTU, INC., 2007 ANNUAL
STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH 2 (2006), available at http://www.pgp.com/
downloads/research_reports/ponemon_reg_direct.html (registration required).
If it were that simple, TJX’s breach of over forty-five million records would cost
them $9 billion. See Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, TJX Discloses Largest Data Theft:
45.7M Customers, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2007, at 3B.
53. For example, Carnegie Mellon’s CERT publishes numbers of reported
security incidents, but makes no claim that these incidents reflect the number of
actual incidents. See CERT, CERT Historical Statistics, http://www.cert.org/stats/
historical.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
54. See SOO HOO, supra note 50, at 9.
55. Confirmation biases would lead organizations to make guesses or select
data based on existing beliefs. See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 48, at 361.
56. Being risk averse, these organizations may overspend on security—a
problem that may not worry consumers but hampers economic efficiency.
57. See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 48, at 361 (discussing confirmation
biases); Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 928 (noting that organizations can
inaccurately calculate data security investment costs and benefits).
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58

distributed, indirect, or immeasurable costs.
Equipment
purchases and labor expenses, for example, are both hard-dollar
59
60
Productivity savings are soft-dollar gains.
Security
costs.
investments almost always combine hard-dollar costs with soft-dollar
61
Many organizations favor hard-dollar savings over soft
savings.
dollars, creating an internal exchange rate in which multiple soft
62
dollars must be saved to justify spending a hard dollar.
Data
breach notification laws may increase potential (i.e., soft-dollar)
losses, but they do not make those dollars any more concrete at the
time security investment decisions are made.
Notification laws have secondary effects that improve security
somewhat. Publicity resulting from a large data breach can affect
63
These
public perception, profits, stock prices, and jobs.
secondary effects encourage careful data handling only to the
extent that they are significant and predictable. Unpredictable,
poorly estimated, or trivial costs fail to improve security because
organizations cannot use them to create realistic cost-benefit
comparisons.
Data breach laws also increase costs to breaching organizations
through the laws’ requirements for notifying the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in the event of a breach. The FTC can then file
suit without meeting the same burden of harm and cause-in-fact
64
that an individual would require, and through civil actions and
58. See, e.g., April L. Dmytrenko, Cost Benefit Analysis, RECORDS MGMT. Q., Jan.
1997, at 16–17.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For example, security improvements require devoting resources to
hardware, software, or process development—hard dollar costs—in return for an
unknown decrease in the risk of a possible future security vulnerability with
unknown impact.
62. To many, soft dollars do not count as real dollars. See Mark Ousnamer,
Hide-and-Seek Cost Justification, IIE SOLUTIONS, Jan. 2002, at 22.
63. For example, after it suffered a security breach in 2005 affecting forty
million credit and debit cardholders, CardSystems lost its contract with Visa to
process credit cards and then declared bankruptcy in 2006. Shanon D. Murray,
CardSystems Files Liquidation Plan, DAILY DEAL, May 17, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 8444298. The repercussions for executives and managers at AOL and
Ohio University were more personal; they lost their jobs after data breach events.
See Ann Bednarz & Denise Dubie, IT Execs Feel the Heat As Security Woes Multiply,
NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1.
64. Consumer suits require showing that the consumer was individually
harmed as a result of the breach, but the FTC has a cause of action on behalf of all
consumers over unfair acts or trade practices under the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 921–22.
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consent decrees, it can levy fines and require improvements in
65
The FTC has exercised this right in a
security procedures.
66
number of cases. Although FTC notification requirements raise
the probable costs of a security incident, they do not improve those
costs’ predictability.
3.

Cost Shifting

For most owners of large databases, the risk of poor data
67
security is a negative externality.
The data subject bears the
68
primary risk of data loss but has no ability to protect her own data.
The database owner can protect the data but may not have
69
economic incentives to do so. By shifting costs of a breach from
consumers to database owners, laws can internalize those
70
Current data breach laws do little or nothing to
externalities.
71
Their textual provisions rarely provide direct
shift these costs.
72
compensation to data subjects, and consumer efforts to recover in
court have usually failed.
Lawsuits following major data breaches show that courts are
not willing to entertain causes of action for harm from a breach.
The main problem is the difficulty of showing actual harm and
73
Common law negligence and constitutional
cause-in-fact.
standing require plaintiffs to suffer genuine harm from the

65. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m) (2000).
66. See, e.g., In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749
(F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2006); In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C.
Dec. 1, 2005); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 (F.T.C.
Sept. 20, 2005).
67. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy
Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2006).
68. See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 44, at 362–66.
69. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
70. See Goldberg, supra note 47, at 545.
71. It has, however, become "standard industry practice" for companies to
offer free credit monitoring after a breach, even when applicable data breach
notification laws do not require it. 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 35.
72. See Ian C. Ballon, A Legal Analysis of State Security Breach Statutes, 903 PRAC.
L. INST.: PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 135, 155–58 (June–July 2007) (discussing remedies for noncompliance in
various state breach notification statutes).
73. See Denis T. Rice, Increased Civil Litigation Over Privacy and Security Breaches,
902 PRAC. L. INST.: PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 149, 173–77 (June–July 2007) (describing plaintiffs’ difficulties
showing cause-in-fact and harm in data mishandling lawsuits).
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74

defendant’s alleged conduct.
A plaintiff in a data-breach case
must prove that (1) her data was among that stolen in a data
breach, (2) she experienced an actual identity theft or other
hardship, and (3) the theft was a result of the data breach and not
some other cause. Because of the difficulties in proving these
elements, courts hearing post-breach lawsuits rarely reach
75
questions of due care.
Cause-in-fact is difficult to prove in data breach cases. People
who steal mass amounts of data usually do not use the data
76
Police often cannot find the
themselves but sell it to others.
77
perpetrators of individual-level fraud. These factors can prevent
identity fraud victims from tracing the misused data back to a data
78
breach. The law in this area, however, is still developing. For
74. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing
three elements for constitutional standing: injury-in-fact; a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and an injury that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965) (listing the elements for a negligence cause of action).
75. See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709–13 (S.D.
Ohio 2007) (stating that “courts have embraced the general rule that an alleged
increase in risk of future injury is not an ‘actual or imminent’ injury,” therefore,
plaintiffs do not have standing in such identity theft cases); Hendricks v. DSW
Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (stating that
the plaintiff did not claim any cognizable damages as a result of a data theft); Forbes
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006) (citing
the rule that the perceived risk of future harm—as opposed to a “reasonably
certain future injury”—will not satisfy the damages requirement). But see Guin v.
Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at
*3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (finding a duty of care under the Gramm-Leach
Bliley Act, but one that did not extend to a duty to encrypt the contents of a
laptop, which was later stolen); Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of Am. Fed’n of State,
County, & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306,
at *1–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (allowing negligence claims resulting from
misuse of inadequately safeguarded personal information). Note that Bell v.
Michigan Council involved clear cause-in-fact and harm (fraud by the defendant’s
treasurer’s daughter). Id.
76. See Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, But Few Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at
G1 (discussing recent breaches involving mass amounts of stolen data).
77. See Erin Dowe, Frustration Station: Attempting to Control Your Credit, 16 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 359, 362–63 (2006) (noting that identity fraud offenders
remain uncaught “more often than not” and that the remoteness of fraud makes
perpetrators hard to catch).
78. One successful investigation shows how far stolen data can travel before it
is used. In June, 2007, authorities arrested four people in Florida in connection
with the TJX and Polo Ralph Lauren breaches. See Larry Greenemeier, Arrests in
TJX Case—Data Theft’s Long Tentacles, INFO.WK., July 16, 2007, at 20. The data used
by the Florida men to create counterfeit credit cards came from Cuban nationals
in a fraud ring, who bought the numbers from criminals in Eastern Europe. Id.
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example, in Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, a plaintiff
suffered $7,000 in actual damages from “unknown individuals” who
79
opened accounts in his name. Because the plaintiff had shared
his address and Social Security number with others, the district
80
court held that he could not prove cause-in-fact. A Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that the possible causal
relationship between the breach and the identity theft allowed the
81
case to survive summary judgment.
The need to show actual damages has generated some novel
theories of harm. Plaintiffs have tried to claim damages for the
82
costs of credit monitoring and other preventive measures. Courts
have rejected these claims, finding that the costs have been
83
incurred in mere anticipation of possible future harm. Given the
84
lack of other direct, measurable harms from data breaches,
85
plaintiffs continue to test the boundaries of damage theories.
79. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB,
2005 WL 2465906, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No.
05-16990, 2007 WL 4116068 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007).
80. Id. at *7.
81. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, No. 05-16990, 2007 WL
4116068, at *3–4 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007).
82. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007);
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709–13 (S.D. Ohio 2007);
Bell v. Acxiom, Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct.
3, 2006); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D.
Mich. 2006); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D.
Minn. 2006); Stollenwerk, 2005 WL 2465906, at *2–3.
83. See e.g., Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 709–13 (holding the cost of credit
monitoring after a breach unrecoverable because it was incurred in anticipation of
future injury); Hendricks, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 780 (rejecting cost of credit
monitoring after a data breach as a theory for recovery); Guin v. Brazos Higher
Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D. Minn.
Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that the threat of future harm does not meet the damage
requirement necessary to bring an action for negligence).
84. The biggest problem with a data breach is the risk that the compromised
data will be misused. Until misuse has happened, however, breach victims’ direct
costs consist of time, effort, and money spent responding to the breach,
purchasing credit monitoring services, freezing their credit records, or consulting
experts on other options for protecting themselves. See PONEMON INST., NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION 17 (2006), http://www.whitecase.
com/news/detail.aspx?news=670 (follow “click here” hyperlink near the end of
the page).
85. These claims bear a remarkable similarity to the enhanced-risk and
medical monitoring claims sometimes seen in toxic tort cases. Enhanced risk is
controversial even in that context, where the risk is of death or serious disease. See
Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure
Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 285, 328–29 (1994). Courts seem
unlikely to soon allow enhanced risk theories of harm for the relatively trivial
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Banks have fared no better than consumers in their attempts
to recover data breach costs. Some of the most notable litigation in
this area resulted from a data breach incident at BJ’s Wholesale
86
Club in Pennsylvania. The facts of the case tell a typical story:
poor security practices at BJ’s allowed third parties to access full
87
After some of
magnetic stripe data for members’ credit cards.
these card numbers were used to rack up millions of dollars in
88
fraudulent charges, Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union
89
(PSECU) reissued over twenty thousand credit cards. It then sued
90
BJ’s and BJ’s acquiring bank for the cost of reissuing the cards,
claiming negligence and breach of contract as a third party
91
beneficiary.
92
The federal district court rejected all of PSECU’s claims. It
93
held that the economic loss doctrine barred PSECU’s tort claims.
It also dismissed PSECU’s claims for breach of contract, equitable
94
indemnification, and unjust enrichment. In a later decision, the
95
court also rejected the remaining third party beneficiary claim.
The failure of post-breach lawsuits illustrates how little the data
breach notification laws do to compensate victims of data breach.
Courts are reluctant to classify immediate post-breach costs as
harms. Even with more serious later harms that exploit breached
data, the difficulty of showing cause-in-fact makes it nearly
impossible for those harmed to recover from the organization
whose mishandling of data predicated the problem.
financial harms that result from data breaches. See also Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638–39
(comparing claims for credit monitoring to requirements for recovery in toxic tort
risk cases).
86. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d
317, 322 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
87. Id. See also discussion supra note 13.
88. See In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788
(F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005).
89. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 322.
90. Id. An “acquiring bank” processes credit card transactions for a
merchant. See discussion infra Part III.A.
91. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 322.
92. Id. at 327–31.
93. Id. at 326–30. The economic loss doctrine prevents recovery in tort for
economic damages unless there is damage to the plaintiff’s person or property.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998).
94. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 338.
95. Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:CV-04-1554,
2006 WL 1724574, at *1, *13 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006) (granting summary
judgment for Fifth Third Bank on the third party beneficiary claims that remained
after the court had granted a motion to dismiss on all other claims).
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III. THE NEXT STEP: PCI-BASED LAWS
In light of cases such as BJ’s Warehouse, and given continuing
data breach announcements, existing data breach notification laws
clearly were not enough to stop mishandling of personal data.
Minnesota’s legislature saw a possible solution in the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard. To explain why PCI DSS was
perceived as a possible solution, this section first describes the
payment card industry and the role of PCI DSS within it. Such
information provides the necessary background for the ensuing
discussion of Minnesota’s law.
A. Background: Payment Cards and PCI DSS
The Visa and MasterCard payment brands are incorporated as
96
associations of financial institutions. These institutions consist of
97
“Issuers” issue credit cards to
“issuers” and “acquirers.”
consumers while “acquirers” process credit card transactions for
98
merchants. When a customer makes a credit card purchase, the
merchant’s acquirer clears the transaction with the customer’s
99
issuer, who charges the purchase against the customer’s account.
The relationships between banks, merchants, and the card
associations rely on a web of contracts. Contracts exist between
merchants and their acquirers and between cardholders and their
100
The issuer and acquirer each hold contracts with the
issuers.
payment brand association through their membership
96. See Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit Card
Industry, 17 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 3, at 25 (2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005nov/article2.pdf (describing
the corporate composition of the major credit card brands).
97. See, e.g., Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574 at *2 (discussing
Visa’s relationship with the plaintiff and defendant financial institutions).
American Express, Discover, and JCB use a different model: they issue credit cards
and process merchant transactions themselves without the participation of other
financial institutions. See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three
Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 946–47 (2007).
98. See id. at *2 (discussing Visa’s relationship with the plaintiff and
defendant financial institutions).
99. See
Corporate.Visa.com, Understanding Payment Transactions,
http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/fs/corporate/transactions.jsp (last visited
Feb. 3, 2008).
100. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *2–3. This
description simplifies the relationships. For example, payment processors may act
as intermediaries between merchants and acquiring banks, but they are not
relevant to the discussions in this note. See Corporate.Visa.com, supra note 99.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2
4. GRAVES - ADC

4/28/2009 3:24 PM

1130

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

101

agreements.
The issuer in a transaction usually has no direct
contractual relationship with the acquirer (except as a co-member
102
of the card association) or with the merchant.
Card association membership contracts require banks to
comply with the association Operating Regulations and the PCI
103
PCI DSS is a set of technical and business process
DSS.
requirements for anyone who processes, handles, or stores credit
104
card information. Visa, Mastercard, Discover, JCB, and American
Express jointly developed PCI DSS and created the PCI Security
105
The individual card
Standards Council to manage the standard.
106
The credit card companies include
brands enforce compliance.
PCI DSS in their contracts with acquiring banks; if a bank is found
to violate the standard, the card company can levy fines against the
107
The acquiring bank usually passes this fine
offending acquirer.
108
to the merchant whose poor security caused the violation.
Unlike many industry and government security standards that
109
speak in generalities and leave room for interpretation, PCI DSS
sets specific requirements. It requires particular methods of
110
prescribes network security technologies and
encryption,
111
112
configurations, and demands or forbids certain practices. One
101. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *3 (describing
Visa’s “Operating Regulations”).
102. For example, in the BJ’s Wholesale case, PSECU tried to argue that it was
a third party beneficiary of the contract between BJ’s Wholesale and its acquirer,
Fifth Third Bank because PSECU had no contract with either Fifth Third or BJ’s
Wholesale. See id. at *1 (explaining PSECU’s third-party beneficiary claim).
103. Id. at *9.
104. See PCI Security Standards Council, About the PCI DSS, available at
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
105. PCI Security Standards Council, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about/faqs.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
106. Id.
107. Mike Petitti, Community Banks Benefit from Awareness of Payment Card
Security, CMTY BANKER, Apr. 2007, at 32. See, e.g., Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa USA
Pledges $20 Million in Incentives to Protect Cardholder Data (Dec. 12, 2006),
available at http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press667.jsp.
108. Petitti, supra note 107, at 32.
109. For example, the FTC’s rules under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
call for “appropriate” safeguards against “reasonably foreseeable” risks. 16 C.F.R. §
314.4 (2007). Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) regulations allow covered entities to use any security measures that allow
such entities “reasonably and appropriately” to implement the standards necessary
for compliance. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2007).
110. PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5.
111. See id. at 3–4 (requiring network firewalls and specifying some ways in
which these firewalls must be configured).
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113

such requirement prohibits storing sensitive authentication data.
Under PCI DSS, anyone handling credit card data must never
store—even if encrypted—a card’s full track data, card verification
114
code, or PIN verification code after authorization has cleared.
Despite low early compliance with PCI DSS, merchants appear
115
In
to be making progress in satisfying its security requirements.
July 2007, Visa announced that ninety-six percent of large
merchants that accept Visa as payment no longer stored full track
116
That statistic only addresses one PCI DSS
card data.
requirement; large merchants continue to struggle to comply with
117
the rest of PCI DSS’s requirements.
B. Minnesota’s Plastic Card Security Act
1.

Summary and History

In May 2007, Minnesota enacted a data security law based on
118
PCI DSS.
The law implements, in a modified form, the
112. See id. at 12 (requiring annual network and application penetration tests);
id. at 8 (prohibiting developer access to production databases).
113. Id. at 5. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
114. PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5.
115. See Evan Schuman, Have Retailers Given Up on PCI Compliance?, EWEEK, May
10, 2007, available at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Retail/Have-Retailers-Given-Upon-PCI-Compliance/.
116. Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa Marks Progress in Securing Merchant
Systems (July 30, 2007), available at http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press
719.jsp. Large merchants are those that process over one million transactions per
year. Id.
117. See RSA, THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY STANDARD IN 2007, at
1 (2007), available at https://rsa-email.rsa.com/servlet/campaignrespondent.
Small merchants are doing even worse, with only a nineteen percent compliance
rate as of March 2007. Id.
118. Act of May 21, 2007, No. 1758, ch. 108, § 1, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
500–01 (West), 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (codified at MINN. STAT. §
325E.64 (Supp. 2008)). Minnesota was not the first state to contemplate such a
law. A Texas bill would have adopted PCI DSS as law by reference so that any
change to PCI DSS would be required under Texas law. See H.B. 3222, sec. 1, §
48.102(c), 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.
us/tlodocs/80r/billtext/html/HB03222E.htm. That approach would have given
private organizations the power to create public law, raising due process concerns.
See id. It also would have influenced contract negotiations involving the card
brands because the PCI Standards Council could impose any condition it wanted
as a matter of law by making it part of PCI DSS. Fortunately, the Texas bill died in
the Senate committee. See Texas Legislature Online, 80(R) History for H.B. 3222,
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=80R&Bill=HB3222
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Vijayan, supra note 14.
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standard’s prohibition against storing full track data. Specifically,
it mandates that no one conducting business in Minnesota may
store a PIN verification code, card security code, or full track data
120
after transaction authorization.
The law creates a private cause of action for financial
institutions to recover from entities that fail to meet the statute’s
121
It requires a breached entity to reimburse certain
requirements.
122
costs that a financial institution incurs related to the breach,
offset by any reimbursement the financial institution receives from
123
a credit card company.
Other states have proposed similar bills, but none had become
124
Time will tell whether Minnesota’s law
law as of October 2007.
spurs a flurry of other state laws the way California’s breach
notification law did. If it does, those states could learn from what
Minnesota did right and wrong in its law.

119. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007).
120. Id. The law allows storage for forty-eight hours after authorization for PIN
debit transactions. Id. Entities violate the statute even if service providers store
the data for them. Id.
121. Id. § 325E.64, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2008). The cause of action covers
breaches of security that occur on or after August 1, 2008. Id.
122. Id. Financial institutions can recover costs involved in canceling or
reissuing cards, closing accounts and stopping payments, reopening accounts,
refunding unauthorized transactions to cardholders, and notifying cardholders of
the breach. Id. The law also allows financial institutions to recover costs of
damages paid to cardholders. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., S.B. 1675, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (as amended
Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=
&SessionId=51&GA=95&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1675&GAID=9&LegID=29808
&SpecSess=&Session=; Tex. H.B. 3222. A similar California bill was vetoed. See
A.B. 779, 2007–08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0751-0800/ab_779_bill_20070914_enrolled.pdf;
Evan
Schumann, Governor Kills California Data Protection Law, EWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007,
available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2197107,00.asp. California’s
bill would have been broader than Minnesota’s. In addition to prohibiting storage
of sensitive authentication data, it would have restricted the handling of “paymentrelated data,” defined as an “[a]ccount number, credit or debit card number, in
combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would
permit access to an individual’s financial account.” A.B. 779 at § 6, sec.
1798.82(e)(3). Entities would not have been allowed to store payment-related
data unless they had data retention and disposal policies. Id. § 1, sec.
1724.4(b)(1). California’s bill would also have forbidden sending unencrypted
payment-related data over open public networks, and would have required entities
to limit access to payment-related data to people whose job functions require
access. Id. § 1, sec. 1724.4(b)(6)–(7).
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General Features
125

Legislating technology is hard.
A statute must tread a fine
126
line between generality and specificity. Make it too broad, and it
127
If it is too
risks interpretations contrary to the intent of the law.
specific, tying itself to the technology of the time, it can become
outdated or require legislative reconsideration when technology
128
changes.
By adopting part of a detailed technical standard and
trying to generalize it, Minnesota gave its law both of these
problems. In most ways, it is far too narrow and specific, but it also
has surprising areas of generality.
Minnesota’s law covers a narrow set of circumstances; it allows
129
It applies
recovery only by financial institutions, not consumers.
to payment cards, but not other sensitive personal data such as
130
It prohibits
bank account numbers or Social Security numbers.
125. See, e.g., Matt Hines, Policy Experts Split on Spyware Laws, INFOWORLD, June
28, 2007, available at http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/06/28/Policy-expertssplit-on-spyware-laws_2.html (discussing the difficulties in drafting anti-spyware
legislation).
126. See, e.g., Allison W. Freedman, Note, The Electronic Signatures Act: Preempting
State Law by Legislating Contradictory Technology Standards, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 807,
813 (2001) (noting the contrasting technology-specific and technology-neutral
approaches to digital signature laws).
127. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS
UNDER THE DMCA 1–3 (2006), available at http://www.eff.org/files/DMCA_
unintended_v4.pdf (discussing unintended consequences of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act); Hines, supra note 125 (noting pursuit of lawsuits
lacking under the broad SafeWeb Act).
128. See, e.g., Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334,
8357 (Feb. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, & 164) (noting that
“rapidly changing technology makes it impractical and inappropriate to name a
specific [encryption] technology” in administrative regulations); Laura Hildner,
Note, Defusing the Threat Of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through TechnologySpecific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 167 (2006)
(discussing criticisms of technology specific legislation as too slow to keep up with
changing technology).
129. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007). The legislative records
show that the legislature explicitly considered, but then rejected, a cause of action
for consumers. The version reported out of the House Commerce and Labor
Committee would have created a private right of action for “any person injured by
a violation” of the bill’s requirements. H.F. 1758, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2007) (as reported by H. Commerce & Labor Comm., Mar. 20, 2007). The Public
Safety and Civil Justice committee removed the general cause of action and
replaced it with language allowing recovery by financial institutions. Minn. H.F.
1758 (as reported by H. Public Safety & Civil Justice Comm., Mar. 27, 2007). That
language substantially survived to final passage. See 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
500–01 (West).
130. § 325E.64.
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storage of full track credit card data, but sets no standards for data
131
in transit. This narrowness is the law’s chief weakness.
The statute also shows signs of a struggle to adopt a private
contractual security standard as public law. It attempts flexibility by
132
using “access device” as a general term for payment cards, but
loses some of that flexibility when it limits those access devices to
133
134
cards and describes security codes as three or four-digit values.
But the statute also shows signs of unintentional breadth. For
example, its definition of a PIN and PIN verification code could
135
include cardholder names and passwords.
136
The law differs from PCI DSS in a number of ways.
The
largest difference is that it only adopts a small subset of the
131. Id. at subdiv. 2.
132. Id. at subdiv. 1(b). The statute defines an access device as having a
magnetic stripe, microchip, or “other means for storage of information” and says
that access devices include “but [are] not limited to” credit and debit cards. Id.
133. Id. The word “card” may tie the law to a particular physical form of
payment device. See, e.g., THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 888 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining a card as “[a] rectangular piece of stiffened plastic issued by banks and
other institutions . . . .”). The definition could include smart cards, which have
microprocessors and allow sophisticated authentication methods. See generally
Katherine M. Shelfer & J. Drew Procaccino, Smart Card Evolution, COMM. ACM, Jul.
2002, at 83–88, but it would not include payment devices in forms other than
cards. A key fob, for example, is not a card, and a payment device based on one
may not, by the strict language of the statute, be subject to section 325E.64.
134. Id. at subdiv. 1(d). Florida’s definition of an access device in its criminal
identity theft statute is much more precise:
“Access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification
number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument
identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in
conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services,
or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of
funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
135. The statute defines a PIN as a code that identifies the cardholder, and a
PIN verification code as any data used in combination with a PIN to verify the
cardholder’s identity. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 1(h)–(i) (Supp. 2007).
Those definitions might include, for example, usernames and passwords used in
online transactions. Nothing in the statute explicitly requires a PIN or PIN
verification code to be a value stored on an access device. See id.
136. This difference is endemic to public laws based on private standards.
When a legislative implementation differs from the standard that inspired it,
organizations must comply with two similar but slightly different sets of
requirements. If the difference is great enough, the public law could conflict with
the private standard it meant to mimic. The problem can increase over time as
the private standard is updated. Referring to the private standard directly (i.e., a
law requiring all merchants to comply with the requirements of PCI DSS) would
solve this problem, but at the same time, create a worse one by making a private
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137

standard’s requirements.
Minnesota Statutes section 325E.64
only adopts the element of the standard prohibiting storage of
138
PCI DSS is much broader than
“sensitive authentication data.”
that one requirement, however, reflecting the wide range of
139
business processes and controls necessary to ensure data security.
Fortunately for merchants, Minnesota’s law differs from PCI
140
DSS by being more permissive. Unlike PCI DSS, it allows a fortyeight hour window for storing debit card information after a
141
It may also allow entities to avoid liability by
transaction.
142
143
Since
encrypting full track data, a practice PCI DSS prohibits.
Minnesota’s law is more permissive than PCI DSS, merchants who
comply with PCI DSS will also be in compliance with Minnesota’s
144
The reverse is not true. Merchants who comply with the
law.
provisions of Minnesota’s law would not necessarily be in strict
145
compliance with PCI DSS.
3.

Improvement on Data Breach Notification Laws

Minnesota’s law fixes some of the problems that make data
breach laws ineffective.
It allows cost-shifting for financial
institutions and further increases the potential cost of a data
contractual agreement public law. See discussion supra note 118.
137. See § 325E.64, subdiv. 2.
138. Id. See also PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5.
139. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 1 (listing PCI’s twelve requirement
categories).
140. PCI DSS technically has room for permissiveness in that it allows
compensating controls. See id. at 16; PCI DSS GLOSSARY, supra note 13. An
organization storing full track credit card data might comply with PCI DSS
through compensating controls, but it would still violate Minnesota’s law.
141. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007); PCI DSS, supra note 14, at
5. The Minnesota law applies only to debit card transactions, not credit card
payments. § 325E.64, subdiv. 2.
142. Section 325E.64 defines “breach of the security of the system” by
reference to Minnesota’s security breach notification law, which defines it as the
“unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.” MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv.
1(d) (2006) (emphasis added). The breach notification law defines “personal
information” as certain unencrypted data. Id. at subdiv. 1(e) (emphasis added). If a
security breach requires unauthorized access to unencrypted data, encrypted data
cannot be “breached” as that term is defined in Minnesota law. Because liability
depends on a breach of security, encrypting data might allow data handlers to
avoid liability even though the retention requirement itself does not exempt
encrypted data.
143. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5.
144. See generally § 325E.64; PCI DSS, supra note 14.
145. See § 325E.64; PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5.
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146

breach.
However, the law does nothing to directly help
consumers, and leaves an organization’s expected data-breach cost
unpredictable.
Minnesota’s law allows financial institutions to recover the cost
of reissuing credit cards when someone else suffers a breach of
147
As such, the statute is a
stored sensitive authentication data.
direct salvo at the BJ’s Wholesale result, and a look forward to the
148
Recall that in the BJ’s Wholesale case,
pending TJX litigation.
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (PSECU) sued BJ’s
credit card processor, Fifth Third Bank, after a security breach
compromised full track credit card data stored in violation of Visa’s
149
The court denied all of PSECU’s claims
operating regulations.
150
for relief. Had that case been litigated under Minnesota law after
January 1, 2008, Minnesota Statutes section 325E.64 would have
151
provided PSECU a viable cause of action.
152
Some have argued that the law is unnecessary.
Card
Association Operating Agreements already require anyone
153
handling credit card data to meet PCI DSS requirements.
Everyone involved in a payment card transaction has a contract
with someone else and could establish rules for liability and
154
PSECU, for example, could have
reimbursement by contract.
negotiated a contract with Visa that would have required Visa to

146. See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3.
147. See § 325E.64, subdiv. 3.
148. See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litigation, No. 07-10162-WGY, 2007
WL 2982994, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 2007); Pa. State Employees Credit Union v.
Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Cf. Pa. State
Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:CV-04-1554, 2006 WL 1724574,
at *13 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006).
149. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
150. Id. at 338 (dismissing all claims other than the third party contract claim.
Subsequently, the third party claim was also dismissed in 2006 WL 1724574, at
*13).
151. See § 325E.64.
152. See Oehlsen, supra note 19.
153. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *3. The PSECU case
discusses Visa’s integration of its Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP)
into its Operating Agreements. Id. CISP is a Visa-specific program that started in
2001 and was incorporated into PCI DSS when the latter industry-wide standard
arose in 2004. See Visa USA, Cardholder Information Security Program,
http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/cisp_overview.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
154. See supra Part II.A for a description of the contractual relationships
between consumers, issuers, merchants, and acquirers.
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reimburse PSECU any costs PSECU incurred replacing cards.
In
156
fact, the Operating Regulations contain just this sort of provision.
In the BJ’s Wholesale case, Visa had “exercised its right under the
Operating Regulations” to reallocate losses, forcing Fifth Third
157
Bank to pay over $870,000 to issuing banks.
Minnesota’s card security law is not completely unnecessary, as
it does not merely duplicate rights issuers have under the
Operating Regulations. Visa has forbidden the storage of full track
158
data since 1993, yet fourteen years later full track storage is still a
159
Moreover, the Operating Regulations do not cover all
problem.
160
For example, the
the forms of loss that the Minnesota law does.
Operating Regulations allow reallocation of losses for fraud, but
161
not for “operational costs” such as replacing lost credit cards.
Visa also retains sole control over all disputes between member
162
financial institutions under the Operating Regulations.
Arguments that Minnesota’s law meddles with freely-made
contracts have some merit, however. Each issuer enters into the
association membership voluntarily, with knowledge of the
Operating Regulations and their dispute resolution procedures.
The financial institutions that issue credit cards can ostensibly
protect themselves through contracts; consumers cannot. Yet the
Minnesota law protects financial institutions, not consumers.

155. As unlikely as this seems given the relative power of the card associations
compared with individual financial institutions, there may be some room for
negotiation in the agreements.
156. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *5.
157. Id. Visa also levied $555,000 in fines against Fifth Third Bank for
violations of the Operating Regulations. Id. Those fines were not redistributed to
issuers. Id.
158. Id. at *7.
159. The BJ’s Wholesale and TJX breaches are just two examples of data
breaches involving stored sensitive authentication data. Visa reports that of
merchants who handle more than one million transactions per year, ninety-six
percent now claim not to store sensitive authentication data, but compliance
among smaller organizations is lagging. See Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa Marks
Progress in Securing Merchant Systems (July 30, 2007), available at
http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press719.jsp.
160. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (Supp. 2007); Pa. State Employees Credit Union,
2006 WL 1724574, at *4–5 (describing Visa’s Operating Regulations).
161. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *4–5.
162. Id. (describing dispute resolution procedures under Visa’s Operating
Regulations). The dispute resolution procedures do not claim to be exclusive—
members can still pursue legal options against other members outside the Visa
system. Id. at *6.
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IV. THE FINISH LINE: A STATUTORY STANDARD OF DATA SECURITY
DUE CARE
Data breach notification laws do not do enough to encourage
secure handling of data, and do nothing to compensate victims.
Minnesota’s card security law creates a narrow remedy to financial
institutions that have to reissue credit cards, but offers no help to
consumers. A better data security law is needed: one that would
meet the behavior modification and compensation goals described
in Part II.B.2.
Several principles should guide such a law. First, it should tilt
163
the cost-benefit equation toward securing data. Second, it should
164
Third, the law
compensate victims who suffer actual harm.
should be flexible enough to remain relevant as technology
165
Fourth, any related statutes of limitations or repose
changes.
166
should allow recovery when breach-related fraud is discovered.
Finally, the law should ameliorate the difficulty of proving cause-in167
fact when a data breach has led to identity theft.
The most appropriate solution would: (1) adopt a statutory
duty of due care in handling data; (2) use a notice standard for the
statute of limitations on identity theft-related tort claims; and (3)
presume cause-in-fact when a consumer has both suffered new
account fraud and been the subject of a data breach. Each of these
components is considered in turn.
A. Duty of Due Care
A due care standard would complement existing data
notification laws and technology-focused laws such as Minnesota’s
payment card law. It would create a multi-tiered approach in which
the duty of due care establishes a general requirement to take
proper care of data, a data breach law requires notification of
consumers when a breach has happened, and a few technology laws
168
specifically define examples of per se negligent behavior. At least
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (describing behavior
modification as a goal of tort law).
164. Id.
165. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
166. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
167. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
168. That would fit products liability’s general approach, where the common
law has long recognized a duty of due care while statutes specify requirements for
warning labels or product features. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.2 (2007) (establishing
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two states now have forms of statutory duty of due care for data
169
protection.
Why due care? Although negligence or strict liability might
satisfy the desired principles, recovery through negligence better
fits the nature of data security. The reasons rely on theoretical
interpretations of tort law.
Economic efficiency analysis suggests that strict liability might
be appropriate. Negligence encourages due care by both the data
170
handler and the victim. Strict liability is efficient when the victim
has no ability to prevent a harm (e.g., data loss) through due care,
because it gives the victim no incentive to take care to avoid the
171
Such is the case with data security. Data subjects cannot
harm.
improve the handling of their data, nor can they choose to have
172
their data handled by more careful organizations.
This
comparison would seem to give an edge to strict liability, but other
factors favor negligence.
One such factor is the way each theory of liability changes
behavior. Negligence law encourages organizations to avoid
accidents through carefulness, while strict liability creates
incentives for organizations to avoid accidents by lowering their
173
Negligence is appropriate when greater care, not
activity levels.
reduced activity, is the more efficient means of avoiding
174
Strict liability has consequently been imposed on
accidents.
175
176
“abnormally dangerous” activities such as explosive blasting,
food labeling requirements); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 7
(1998) (discussing common-law food product liability); Henry H. Drummonds,
The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 989–90 (2000).
169. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
§ 48.102(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Although both statutes set duties of due care,
neither establishes a private cause of action.
170. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 873–74 (1981), reprinted in 2 LAW AND ECONOMICS 259,
281–82 (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997). Much of this effect
comes from the existence of contributory and comparative negligence, which each
reduce the wrongdoer’s liability (either proportionally for comparative negligence
or entirely for contributory negligence) according to the victim’s share of the fault
for the accident. Id.
171. Id. at 282.
172. See Solove, supra note 40, at 1234–38.
173. See Landes & Posner, supra note 170, at 283–324.
174. Id. at 285.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1979).
176. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513–14 (2d Cir.
1931) (applying strict liability to blasting).
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178

handling of hazardous wastes, and certain uses of poisons.
Whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous” rests in part on
whether reasonable care can eliminate the risk involved in the
179
The proper liability regime for data breaches therefore
activity.
depends on whether they are the “inevitable byproduct” of data
180
collection, or whether they can be reduced by the application of
181
due care.
Products liability law offers a useful parallel. Design defects
fall under negligence law because due care in design can avoid that
182
Manufacturing defects generate strict
particular kind of flaw.
liability causes of action because those defects are seen as inherent
183
Even careful
and unavoidable when manufacturing products.
manufacturers sometimes make defective products and society
benefits by putting the cost of the harms caused by manufacturing
184
defects on the manufacturer rather than the consumer.
The history of publicly disclosed breaches shows plenty of
room for improving due care in handling data. Some of the more
infamous data breaches happened to retailers who operated
185
186
stored unencrypted card data,
insecure wireless networks,
failed to verify that certain customers actually were small businesses
187
instead of data thieves, or did not use “simple, low-cost, and
177. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 313 (W.D.
Tenn. 1986) (applying strict liability to chemical maker that buried toxic waste
near a water source), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
178. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 139 (La. 1971)
(applying strict liability to storage of poisonous gas), superseded by statute, LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2323 (1980), as recognized in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.
2d 1123 (La. 1988); Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding
fumigator to a strict liability standard).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979).
180. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 264–65 (2007).
181. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 276–78 (2005) (arguing in favor of a negligencebased theory of data security liability).
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o (1998).
183. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749
(F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2006); In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C.
Dec. 1, 2005); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788
(F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005).
186. See In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2005);
In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 (F.T.C. Sept. 20,
2005).
187. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Release of Consumers' Data Spurs ChoicePoint Inquiries,
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readily available” methods of avoiding software application
188
189
Other breaches involved un-patched software, weak
attacks.
190
user IDs and passwords, and postings of confidential data to the
191
These data breaches were not inevitable side-effects of
Internet.
handling data; they were the direct results of preventable
mishandling of data.
Of course, not all causes of data breach are so egregious. In
192
many cases, data was lost because of insider misbehavior, lost or
193
194
195
stolen laptops, disks lost in the mail, or lost backup tapes. In
at least some of these cases, data was lost despite arguably careful
196
or through unforeseeable acts of third parties.
handling,
Perhaps some data breaches are unavoidable, but it is too soon to
know because so many breaches are clearly avoidable. Until due
care is shown not to significantly reduce data disclosure, the law
should err on the side of encouraging due care rather than
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at C2.
188. In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749 (F.T.C.
Feb. 23, 2006).
189. See Press Release, Univ. of Colo., CU-Boulder Arts and Scis. Server Hacked
on May 12 (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/
2007/224.html.
190. See Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C7.
191. See Stewart Verney, Credit Union Paying for ID Theft Protection After Info Error,
JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., June 1, 2007, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/
jacksonville/stories/2007/05/28/daily24.html.
192. See, e.g., Shirley Duglin Kennedy, I’ve Been Violated, INFO. TODAY, June 1,
2006, at 17 (dishonest insider at the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicles); Paul
Nowell, Banks Look At Insiders in Security Lapse, FORT WAYNE J.-GAZETTE, July 11,
2005, at 1C (reporting insider theft at Wachovia and Bank of America).
193. See, e.g., Melissa Allison, Missing Starbucks Laptops Had Data on 60,000
People, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A1 (containing a brief chronology of lost
laptops with personal information, including those at Starbucks, Fidelity
Investments, and Ameriprise); David Stout, Veterans Agency to Atone with Free Credit
Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A22 (describing Veterans Affairs breach
caused by lost laptop).
194. See, e.g., Andy Miller & Bill Hendrick, Georgians’ Personal Data Lost,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 11, 2007, at A1.
195. See, e.g., Will Wade, Security Watch, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2006, at 5
(reporting 2.6 million Circuit City customer records inadvertently thrown into
trash); Assoc. Press, 4 Providence Workers out over Data Theft, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 25,
2006, at C5 (reporting theft of backup tapes from a van).
196. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668
RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that an
employee whose company laptop was stolen from his home “lived in a relatively
‘safe’ neighborhood and took” reasonable precautions against break-in, so theft of
the laptop was not foreseeable).
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imposing strict liability.
Finally, a negligence cause of action encourages data collectors
to consider the effects its care of data has on others. Instead of
merely estimating the cost to themselves should a breach occur,
data collectors would have to use the same formula a jury would
use—Judge Learned Hand’s formula comparing the burden of
197
The loss
mitigation with the probability and degree of loss.
portion of that calculation encompasses the loss to data subjects,
not merely the data handler, and represents a vast improvement
over data handlers’ current self-centered cost-benefit calculations
when security is concerned. Even if data handlers use different
values than a jury would, or estimate different non-optimal
198
values, at least they would be trying to estimate the right values.
B. Implementation Details
Even with a statutory duty of security due care, a victim could
not recover if the statute of limitations and repose had expired, or
if they could not prove cause-in-fact harm. Ensuring appropriate
statutes of limitation and cause-in-fact standards could solve these
issues.
1.

Statute of Limitations

Some forms of post-breach harm can be hard to discover
before the statute of limitations has expired. A discovery standard
would allow enough time to file suit without subjecting breached
199
organizations to near-endless liability.
Specifically, a statute
establishing a duty of due care should allow actions within two years
of when someone discovers, or reasonably should have discovered,
200
that harm has occurred.

197. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
198. See Citron, supra note 180, at 263–64 (discussing the “uncertainty
dilemma” of economic theories of negligence law).
199. The statute of limitations under a discovery standard begins to run when
the plaintiff knows or should reasonably know of the existence of the cause of
action. Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 n.16 (Minn.
1999) (citation omitted).
200. Even without a discovery standard, the statute should not begin to run
until some post-breach harm has happened. See Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280
Minn. 147, 153, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (“An action for negligence cannot be
maintained, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run, until damage has
resulted from the alleged negligence.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/2

28

Graves: Minnesota's PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty
4. GRAVES - ADC

2008]

4/28/2009 3:24 PM

MINNESOTA'S PCI LAW

1143

A discovery standard is needed because victims may not notice
201
Some
post-breach harms until several years after the breach.
202
and misuse often creates no
breached data never expires,
203
Many victims of identity theft find out about it
noticeable signs.
204
205
Recent
only when they are denied credit or even arrested.
statistics show that nearly one-quarter of identity theft victims do
not discover the fraud within two years, and almost one in ten does
206
These factors suggest
not find out until five years have passed.
that Minnesota’s default six-year statute of limitations for tort
207
claims may not be long enough unless a discovery standard is
used. A two-year post-discovery statute of limitations would
recognize the need for a discovery standard, but reduce a data
handler’s exposure to suit once that harm has been discovered.
A due care statute implementing a discovery standard must say
so explicitly. The Minnesota Supreme Court generally has not
recognized a discovery standard where a statute did not expressly
208
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court’s
include it.
201. See Solove, supra note 40, at 1251–55 (detailing the undiscovered harm
often caused by Social Security number identity theft).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Identity Theft: Restoring Your Good Name: Hearing before the S.
Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 107th Cong. 12
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearings], (statement of Howard Beales, Director, FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection) (testifying that five percent of identity theft
victims were unaware of the theft five years after it happened, and that the average
time to detect an identity theft was twelve months), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=171&wit_id=348.
204. See, e.g., Acton v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1092,
1096 (D. Ariz. 2003) (involving a plaintiff who discovered inaccurate credit
information after a mortgage loan was denied).
205. Criminal record identity theft happens when a criminal uses stolen
identity information to “evade legal sanctions and criminal records.” See 2002
Hearings, supra note 203, at 13. This form of fraud is especially pernicious because
consumers have no easy way to discover that they have criminal records. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-363, IDENTITY THEFT: PREVALENCE AND COST
APPEAR TO BE GROWING 61 (March 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02363.pdf.
206. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA: JANUARY 1–
DECEMBER 31, 2006 fig.8 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/micro
sites/idtheft/downloads/clearinghouse_2006.pdf (summarizing 2006 statistics
from the FTC’s Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse).
207. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (2006).
208. See, e.g., Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643
(Minn. 1999) (rejecting the discovery rule for professional malpractice); Johnson
v. Winthrop Labs., 291 Minn. 145, 150–51, 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971) (rejecting
the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases). But see Schmucking v. Mayo, 183
Minn. 37, 40–41, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (Minn. 1931) (applying the discovery rule in
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decision in TRW Inc. v. Andrews casts doubt on whether the
209
notification standard would apply in identity theft cases.
Including the discovery standard in statutory language would avoid
creating interpretive questions.
2.

Proving Cause-in-Fact

The remaining problem is the difficulty of proving cause-in210
fact.
Common-law negligence requires the plaintiff to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the
211
plaintiff’s harm. The problem with data-related harms is that it is
often difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to trace the original
212
source of misused data.
The law has dealt with similar problems by allowing rebuttable
213
Presumed cause-in-fact reverses
presumptions of cause-in-fact.
the burden of proof by requiring the defendant to disprove
214
Courts have used this standard when causation would
causation.

cases of fraud).
209. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27–28 (2001) (rejecting the
discovery standard in an identity theft claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
A broad interpretation of TRW might suggest that the statute of limitations in all
identity theft cases begins to run at the time of the harm, not discovery. See id.
Presumably, that standard would extend to third-party liability for harm.
210. This section assumes a plaintiff has suffered actual post-breach harm.
Therefore, the problem at issue is not whether the plaintiff has actually been
harmed, but whether she can prove cause-in-fact.
211. Schulz v. Feigal, 273 Minn. 470, 476, 142 N.W.2d 84, 89 (1966). Although
the standard does not require eliminating “every other possible hypothesis as to
the cause of the injuries,” it demands more than “speculation or conjecture.” Id.
212. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a), construed in Flores v. Sec. of Health and
Human Servs., 52 Fed. Cl. 294, 299 (2002) (discussing presumed causation under
Vaccine Act); Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 390–91 (2d Cir. 1998)
(summarizing the opinions of Chief Judge Cardozo and Chief Justice Traynor as
allowing a presumption of cause when an act increases the chances of a particular
type of accident, and an accident of that sort actually happens); Erdmann v.
Frazin, 158 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Wis. 1968) (noting a rebuttable presumption of
causation when “one owing a duty to make a place or an employment safe fails to
do it and that accident occurs which performance of the duty was designed to
prevent”); Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation And Risk Contribution
Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 591–92 (1995) (noting that federal Superfund statutes do
not require tracing cause to a particular defendant, in part because “the passage of
years between the time of disposal and cleanup often results in unavailable
relevant documents and knowledgeable witnesses.”).
214. See Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 249, 262–63 (2003) (discussing the
so-called “reversal” cause-in-fact doctrine).
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215

otherwise be difficult to prove, and statutes have adopted it for
216
similar purposes.
A data security due care statute should allow presumptive
causation if the plaintiff proves two elements: (1) that the plaintiff’s
information was compromised in a breach of data under the
defendant’s care; and (2) that the information was both necessary
217
The defendant
and sufficient to enable the actual harm done.
could rebut the presumption by showing another likely source of
218
the misused data.
It could also avoid the presumption by
showing that the data was not actually compromised or that the
data was not necessary or sufficient for the post-breach fraud.
Such a presumption would mitigate the problems of showing
cause-in-fact. It recognizes cause when the plaintiff is prevented
from connecting each of several dots needed to satisfy the
219
common-law rule. When a customer has suffered actual fraud or
other harm following a data breach and the information lost in the
breach was enough to perpetrate that fraud, this rule improves the
plaintiff’s ability to show cause-in-fact, but allows the defendant a
reasonable chance to demonstrate that something other than the
data breach caused the harm.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislatures and courts are still struggling to find the right
approach to data security law. Ultimately, data security will not be
improved through mere notification or through piecemeal
legislation of individual technical requirements.
A statutory
standard of due care for data security could do what these other
laws cannot: take externalities into account, compensate victims for
actual harm, and adapt to new technologies without frequent
legislative revisits. Most importantly, it could help prevent the next
announcement of millions of lost personal data records.

215. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 390–91; Erdmann, 158 N.W.2d at 283.
216. See Flores, 52 Fed. Cl. at 299; Boston, supra note 213, at 591–92.
217. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1788–
91 (1985) (discussing the “necessary element of a sufficient set” test of causality).
218. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 390–91.
219. See Wright, supra note 217, at 1788–89.
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